“A Secretary of State or the Minister of Transport or the Lords
Commissioners of the Admiralty may requisition for Her Majesty’s service any
British ship and anything on board such ship wherever it may be.”
Requisitioning of Ships Order 1982, Order in Council,
Windsor
Castle
, April 4, 1982
The short and crystal clear order shown above seems like a
nautical version of eminent domain, allowing seizure of civilian ships for use
by the British government and indeed that is what it was. What brought
Great Britain
to such a state that the government had to size civilian ships for service
rather than use those of the Royal Navy. It had been a long time in coming. At
the start of World War One the Royal Navy had been the undisputed mistress of
the world’s seaways. Sure, Kaiser Bill wanted
Germany
to have her place in the sun and made a run to have the power of his fleet
equal that of the Royal Navy but the RN stayed supreme. Yet it was World War One
that created the long slide for the Royal Navy. It wasn’t the loss of warships
but the ruinous expense of all out war for four years. With a new naval arms
race brewing after World War One between the
United States
and
Japan
,
Great Britain
felt the need for new construction as well and was only too happy to enter the
Washington Naval Treaty of 1922, even though it meant formally conceding parity
of the Royal Navy and United States Navy.
Britain
never really recovered from World War One and as the economy boomed in the
US
in the 1920s, a troubled British economy only caused more and more cuts in
naval expenditures. The Royal Navy barely had enough time to order new
construction when danger was imminent in the late 1930s.
World War Two was another financial catastrophe for
Great Britain
and at the end of the war with most of her warships worn out there was no money
or inclination for extensive new construction. The USN had become the major navy
of the world as a result of the huge naval construction program during the war
and with the Imperial Japanese Navy destroyed and the Royal Navy folding her
hand. From that point the Royal Navy was a quarter of century slide in the name
of economy and the capabilities of the Fleet Air Arm (FAA) was attrited more
than most. By 1981 it was apparent that the Royal Navy was on course to be an
anti-submarine adjunct to the USN in European waters. A Defense White Paper in
that year called for the Royal Navy to be an ASW force in conjunction with NATO
operations focused on the Soviet Navy. At this time the Royal Navy had one old
light carrier, HMS Hermes, in operation and a new VSTOL carrier, HMS Invincible,
entering service. Negotiations were entered to sell the Hermes to
Chile
and the Invincible to
Australia
. As their Navy atrophied around them, Royal Navy planners had to make do with
the limited tools still at their disposal. Most planning was focused on the
Soviet Navy, as it was considered extremely remote that the Royal Navy would
have to operate in remote locations and the Fleet Train was reduced as badly as
the FAA in the reoccurring budget cuts and draw downs. Still the planners had to
prepare contingency operations and now part of their preparations and planning
consisted of identify British merchant ships that had the operational
capabilities to fulfill lost capabilities of the minimal Fleet Train that
survived the budget ax. Since the 1981 White Paper this had been given a major
emphasis. The proposed program was given the abbreviation of STUFT for Ships
Taken Up From Trade. Since the 1970s the Royal Marines had exercised with
roll-on roll-off RO-RO ferries replacing purpose built landing ships but the
maximum sea voyage was considered three days.
Few of the British public may have noticed the severe reduction in the power
projection ability of their navy and if they did, discounted it because the only
likely threat came from the Red Navy and any dust up with them would also
involve the USN. However, others were watching with an increasing interest. The
Falklands
Islands
are far removed from centers of commerce or world events. Almost treeless, the
Falklands
were the home of near a million sheep but only about 1,800 inhabitants, almost
exclusively of British derivation. In the age of steam power the Falklands were
important as they provided an important link in the world-wide network of
coaling stations set up by
Great Britain
to support the Royal Navy and British merchant marine. In December 1914 the
Falklands made the world headlines as they were the target of Graf von Spee’s
Asiatic Squadron, when he stumbled upon Rear Admiral Sturdee’s two
battlecruisers with the resulting
Battle
of the
Falklands
in which the German Squadron was annihilated. Then they drifted back into
obscurity. However,
Argentina
had claimed the islands called Los Islas Malvinas since 1829 when the small
settlement of
Soledad
was established. This connection was of short duration because the Argentines
were booted from the islands on January 3, 1833 by the British. Nonetheless
Argentine maps continued to show the Islas Malvinas as Argentine property for
the next century and a half. At the start of 1982
Argentina
was run by a military junta run by Army general Galtieri. The economy was in a
shambles but to distract attention the junta had employed the same time-worn
trick of other dictatorships, focus popular attention on an external foe/threat.
Galtieri saw how far the Royal Navy had fallen and considering the great
distance between
Great Britain
and the
Falklands
, he figured that the British would feebly protest a military seizure of the
islands but would not contest their seizure in any meaningful manner.

Plan, Profile & Quarter Views |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
Since 1953 there had been a small detachment of
Royal Marines at
Port Stanley
but the Royal Navy’s presence came in the form of the ice patrol ship
assigned for the Antarctic waters. The last of these vessels was HMS
Endurance, which arrived in 1968. After five years it was
announced that the ice patrol would end and Endurance
recalled but with the death of Juan Peron,
Argentina
again demanded the
Falklands
and the recall of Endurance
was rescinded. In another display of how short the memories of politician can
be, the Endurance
was again scheduled for recall with a series of final visits scheduled for 1982.
In early 1982 Endurance paid her last
scheduled port visits to two Argentine ports and her captain Nick Barker noticed
something different. Something was afoot and Barker felt the hostility and
mounting anger over the British control of the
Falklands
. He sent warnings back to the Admiralty where they were promptly trashed as
being alarmist. On March 19, 1982 Endurance
was at Port Stanley on her last visit to the capital of the
Falklands
. There are another set of islands even more bleak than the
Falklands
and 800 miles to the southeast. The
South Georgia
Islands
had been the home of a whaling station but not mush more. Dependencies and
administered through the
Falklands
. Uninhabited since the whaling station was abandoned, South Georgia was still
claimed by
Britain
. On March 19 Argentines claiming to be looking for scrap metal at the whaling
station, landed at Leith South Georgia and raised the flag of
Argentina
. Rex Hunt the Governor of the Falklands informed
London
and then ordered Barker and Endurance
to take aboard the marines, travel to
South Georgia
and boot the Argentines from the islands. While Endurance
was at South Georgia on April 2, the Argentines invaded the
Falklands
and seized the islands.
A common misconception is that it is always the party of the left that wishes to
slash military expenditures. In the 1920s with the Tories in the
UK
and the Republicans in the
US
, it was the party of the right which slashed military spending. Since May 1979
the British government was run by the redoubtable Conservative Margaret
Thatcher. However, her government had some weak links and the weakest of weak
was Secretary of State for Defense John Nott. In 1981 Nott had slashed funding
of the Royal Navy that had resulted in the recall of Endurance.
He pooh-poohed Barker’s warnings about
Argentina
and even after Argentines landed on South Georgia he arrogantly dismissed any
threat to the
Falklands
. In debate in the House of Commons on March 29 Nott was asked, that in view of
the worsening situation in the
South Atlantic
, why Endurance
should not be funded for a refit for continued service. Nott refused to even
talk of the matter stating that it was far more important to talk about Trident
missiles than nonsensical trivialities in the
South Atlantic
. Even after the invasion on April 2 Nott continued to display a staggering
degree of ineptitude. Chief of Staff for military was Admiral Terence Lewin who
was at a NATO conference in late March 1982. Lewin recognized how serious was
the situation but Nott instructed him to remain at the conference so as not to
alarm the allies.
The First Sea Lord was Admiral Sir Henry Leach and he was called into an
emergency meeting of the cabinet on March 31. Leach, who had clashed with Nott
in the past over the huge slashes in the Royal Navy budget, eagerly welcomed the
opportunity. He knew of the weakness and timidity of Knott, and when Maggie
Thatcher asked for his advice Leach was quick to give it. As Nott squirmed,
Leach lived up to centuries tried traditions of the British First Sea Lord and
stated because of distance and time the Royal Navy could not get forces to the
Falklands in time to prevent an Argentine invasion but could mobilize a strike
force for their re-conquest within days, centered around the only two British
aircraft carriers and the 3rd Commando Brigade. Leach’s counsel was
much more to the liking of Maggie Thatcher than that of her depressed,
pessimistic Secretary of Defense, as Nott had previously told the cabinet that
there was no need for 3rd Commando Brigade. After the meeting Leach
acted with lightning speed and started sending out alerts to necessary units. It
was Leach and the Royal Navy who had put backbone into the response of the
British Government. As the only service chief at the meeting he brimmed over
with confidence in the abilities of the British military machine. The next day
when asked of their assessments, the chiefs of the Royal Army and RAF were much
more cautious but the die had been cast as the meeting on 31 March was the key
event in determining
Britain
’s response. When Lewin returned from the conference he totally supported
immediate dispatch of a strike force.
Air power was crucial. The RAF had limited
abilities to support operations because their nearest usable air field was on
Ascension Island 3,000 miles from the
Falklands
. Using Vulcan bombers and Victor tankers, the RAF could make some astonishing
long distance bomber raids from Wideawake airfield on Ascension but it too far
away to provide Fleet defense, air superiority or combat support for ground
forces. That would have to come from sea borne air frames. In this area the
opaque Nott had also been up to his pernicious tricks. There were only two small
carriers, the new HMS
Invincible, carrying a very appropriate name considering her
destination, and the old light carrier HMS Hermes. It was lucky for
Great Britain
that
Argentina
invaded in April because Nott in his characteristic clueless ham-handedness was
already in negotiations to sell the Invincible
to
Australia
and to get rid of the Hermes
as well in the name of economy. An item of prime importance was to provide a
suitable quantity of airframes for the naval force to provide air superiority,
close air support and resupply missions. Within two days the Privy Council on
April 4 had issued an order authorizing the requisitioning of British merchant
ships to support the
Falklands
campaign. Of prime importance was providing ships capable of emergency air
operations in the event of damage to one of the British aircraft carriers. What
was needed were large ships with large, flat, open decks with sufficient
strength to support the heaviest helicopter in use, the 23-ton RAF Chinook.
While going through photographs of merchant ships, one officer spotted a couple
of merchants that fit the need, the Cunard line Atlantic
Conveyor and Atlantic
Causeway. Designed for North Atlantic trips as a container ship
with roll-on-roll-off RoRo capabilities, the ships were perfect for embarkation
of aircraft, as well has carrying a great amount of provisions for the 3rd
Commando. They were not financial successes in their designed routes and Atlantic
Conveyor was laid up in perfect condition. The Royal Navy could
not have selected a better choice to suit their needs with minimal time
expenditure. Atlantic
Conveyor was immediately requisitioned and on April 16 was at the
Devonport Yard to get her ready for combat operations by strengthening her deck
and further clearance of top hamper. Atlantic Conveyor sailed with
the strike force on April 25 with an initial load of four Chinook and six
Wessex
helicopters. However, upon arriving at
Ascension Island
she embarked more aircraft and left the island carrying 25 airframes, including
Sea Harriers. In contrast Hermes
left with 23 airframes (5 Harriers and 18 helicopters) and Invincible
with 14 airframes (5 Harriers and 9 helicopters). One Harrier on Atlantic
Conveyor was always spotted for immediate take off in case of
Argentine air attack. The strike force left Ascension on April 18.
Of the Argentine forces, it was the Argentine Air Force which provided the
greatest threat to the British. After the cruiser General
Belgrano (Pearl Harbor veteran, Brooklyn class USS Phoenix) was sunk by the HMS
Conqueror, the Argentine Navy was out of the picture, as it
stayed in port. The exception was the use of naval aircraft flying from
Argentine airfields. In contrast to the navy the Argentine Air Force and
participating naval aviation units were fully engaged and were operated with
high skill and bravery, providing a very formidable foe for the Royal Navy. As
has been shown time and time again, the power projection ability of the aircraft
carrier can reverse strategic and tactical situations. The Argentine junta had
calculated that
Britain
couldn’t effectively employ aircraft, as the nearest British airfield was
3,000 miles away. With the British carriers in place within 200 miles of the
Falklands, the British had the great advantage of providing prompt support and a
longer loiter time (still limited to 20 minutes initially) than the Argentine
aircraft, which had a more than 800 mile round trip to reach the islands and
return. For the most part the ordnance was standard free fall iron dumb bombs
but a handful of French Exocet missiles had been purchased by
Argentina
before the conflict. Luckily for
Great Britain
, only five of the smart missiles had been purchased.
By May 1 the British force had closed the Falklands and that day forward
surface ships shelled the
Port Stanley
airfield daily. From the very first the aircraft of the British carriers seized
air superiority, which was never lost, although the skill of the Argentine
pilots could impose significant damage in raids. The first Harrier was lost on
May 4 when it was shot down and two more were lost at sea. Replacements for lost
aircraft were immediately dispatched from Atlantic
Conveyor to the carriers, as the Cunard ship never had to launch
a combat mission from her deck. By May 24 the British Force was operating 80
miles northeast of the islands and anticipated a significant Argentine strike on
May 25, as that was
Argentina
’s National Day. Although there were Argentine strikes scheduled for May 25,
the 22 sorties were not a big effort out of the ordinary. May 25 may not have
been a big push but it provided one of the most successful days achieved by the
aircrews of
Argentina
in the whole campaign.
The first success was a standard bomb strike on HMS
Conventry, which was operating in Falkland Sound. Hit by three
bombs, the
Coventry
was torn apart and sunk within 15 minutes. By this time Atlantic
Conveyor had already flown off all of the embarked Harriers, six
smaller helicopters but only one of the four Chinook heavy lift helicopters. The
ship still carried all of her combat stores to supply 3rd Commando
Brigade and was scheduled to close the
Falklands
that afternoon to land the supplies and balance of helicopters. As the
Coventry
was sinking, the British carrier force was only 60 miles north of
East Falkland
.
Argentina
had already used two of the five Exocet missiles, one sinking HMS
Sheffield, and with only three left, it was vital to use the last
three in attempt to take out one or both of the British carriers. It was the
Argentine Naval Air Arm Super Etendards that carried these missiles. A strike
was launched on May 23 tasked to kill carries but the British force was not
spotted and aircraft returned home with their precious missiles. Early on May 25th
information came in from
Port Stanley
reporting that a large British force was operating around 100 miles north east
of the island. At 1:30PM two Super Etendards left the
Rio Grande
airfield in Tierra del Fuego bound for the
Falklands
, carrying Exocets to be used only against Hermes
and Invincible.
After refueling from a C-130 tanker the aircraft went to the deck 30 feet above
the water when 150 miles from the anticipated British position.
When they turned on their radar the aircraft
immediately pinged off a target of two large and one small ships. When 30 miles
from the target both aircraft simultaneously fired their Exocets at 3:52PM and
immediately turned for home and climbed. After another refueling they
successfully landed back home at 5:38PM. To protect the critical carriers,
merchant ships and escorts were placed on the west side of the formation, as it
was less damaging for the mission to have one of them struck rather an
irreplaceable carrier. The three ships painted by Argentine radar were Atlantic
Conveyor, Ambuscade
and Sir
Tristram. In the British force Ambuscade
and Brilliant
had picked up the aircraft and warships in the force started firing off their
chaff systems when the missile launch was detected. It worked, as the clouds of
chaff confused the Exocets. However, the missiles still picked up one target. Atlantic
Conveyor had not been fitted with a chaff system and stood out
like a red neon sign in the homing radar of the missiles. The ship was turning
to present her stern where the heavy RoRo ramp would act like armor but was too
slow in responding to the wheel. At 3:38PM one missile hit the side of Atlantic
Conveyor. As it entered the port side the missile passed through
the engine control room before igniting between the 2nd and 3rd
decks. Although the warhead did not explode, unexpended fuel started a sever
fire that quickly became out of control.
“There was a great big, vibrating thud and then, almost instantaneously,
the explosion happened inside the ship. It really rocked the ship. I saw Robby
running, thrown off his feet. The rest of us hit the deck and just lay there for
thirty seconds at most. I saw one of our lads coming round the corner of the
superstructure – the front of his shirt was all open, his face was black,
tears were streaming down his face. All he kept saying, over and over again,
was, ‘Fucking great ball of fire.’ I got hold of him and asked him if he
knew who I was but he kept saying the same thing. Then I noticed small bits of
metal in his chest and and some cuts on his face and realized he was wounded.”
Roger Green FAA, Atlantic Conveyor (Task
Force The Falklands War 1982,
Penguin Group, London 1985, by Martin Middlebrook, at page 245) The second
missile may or may have not followed in the same location. There was only one
point of strike on the ship and unless the second missile hit that same area, it
failed to strike. “There
was a thump, a big thump, you could feel it through your feet. They piped that
we had been hit and we were to hit the deck. I thought that they had got it the
wrong way round; it made it difficult later on because we didn’t know whether
we were still under attack. I tried to get in touch with the bridge but the
telephones had gone out. A message was piped to send eight blokes to act as a
stretcher party. I sent them off under an R.A.F. sergeant but they came back a
few seconds later because of the smoke. Their eyes were streaming and even their
respirators couldn’t help. There was no way they could make it. I detailed off
one of the lads to go to the bridge and tell them we couldn’t get to the back
end of the ship.” Nigel Stronach FAA, Atlantic Conveyor (Task
Force The Falklands War 1982,
Penguin Group, London 1985, by Martin Middlebrook, at page 245)

NNT Atlantic Conveyor - Major Parts
Dry-Fitted |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
The ships of the task force immediately sent helicopters with fire fighting
teams but even with all of the specialized man power, the fire could not be
controlled. Worse, it was quickly spreading towards a hold in which 75 tons of
cluster bombs were stored. At 4:15PM the Master of Atlantic
Conveyor, Captain Ian North, issued the order to abandon the
ship. Captain North was last to leave but he and eleven other crewmen were lost.
The task force rescued 150 of the crew. The Atlantic
Conveyor hung on for several days. The fire was too intense to
remove any of the stores and the bow was blown off in one explosion. Yet on May
27 she was still afloat and the tug Irishman
took her under tow. Twice the tow line parted and by the morning of May 28 Atlantic
Conveyor had disappeared beneath the waves. She was the only
merchant ship lost but it was a crippling strike. When struck by the Exocet, the
Atlantic
Conveyor was still carrying to critically needed supplies for 3rd
Commando and three of the four Chinook heavy lift helicopters, which even ore
crippling than the loss of the supplies. The strikes of May 25 may have been one
of the most successful days for Argentine aircraft but it was also one of the
worst days in that losses were very heavy over Falkland Sound. It was a turning
point in that
Argentina
was down to one Exocet and the British carriers were still fully operational
and the quantity of Argentine combat aircraft and their courageous crewmen had
greatly dwindled. Never again would British forces face a serious air threat
after May 25.
The NNT Atlantic Conveyor
Normally, I would not lead a review with problems encountered with a kit but in
the case of the NNT 1:700 scale Atlantic
Conveyor, the problems were so atypical of NNT
kits that I will mention them first. Anyone that has purchased any of the NNT kits already knows how well they are packaged to prevent damage
to the resin parts in transit. However, my copy of the Atlantic
Conveyor did come with parts damaged in transit. The most serious
was the top of the cutwater where there is a solid bulkhead at the tip of the
forecastle had two small parts broken off as shown in the photographs. The
broken parts were there so some careful application of CA and gentle sanding to
smooth will fix this breakage. It is best to use a narrow sanding stick for the
internal face because of the narrow width between the top of the bulkhead and
forecastle deck. A few of the very thin solid bulkheads were broken off but this
is a straightforward fix by simply reattaching or using very thin plastic panels
or resin to replace. I always save the resin casting sheets in kits to use as an
excellent source of repair material as in most cases resin bulkheads are thinner
than the thinnest plastic strip. Later I received an e-mail from Norbert
Thiel of NNT asking if the kit
sent to me had any damage. I had not told him that indeed it had some damage
because it wasn’t anything that I couldn’t easily repair. Apparently other Atlantic
Conveyor kits from the initial release had similar breakage
problems due to inadequate packaging, as it has been the largest NNT
model to date. This has subsequently been corrected but if anyone has such
damage, NNT will replace any damaged
parts at no charge. Now that I have covered the defects, I’ll cover the
numerous pluses of another superb NNT
model.
The NNT Atlantic
Conveyor is in her Falklands fit and includes a deck load of
Harrier fighters,
Wessex
and Chinook helicopters, so that big top deck will be covered with eye candy.
The hull casting is a large slab sided affair, typical of any era merchant ship
in which cargo volume was the prime consideration. As with modern
container/cargo ships the superstructure is at the stern with a long, flat cargo
deck stretching from the bridge to the cutwater. It was exactly that broad flat
deck that caught the attention of the RN Captain when he selected Atlantic
Conveyor for service with Her Majesty’s forces. As far as the
hull sides, there are indented areas which house the anchors, three small square
windows at the stern and a RoRo ramp inset on the transom stern. What is really
remarkable is the exquisite thinness of the solid bulkheads at deck edge.
Their remarkable thinness is what made them so vulnerable to transit damage.
Even so only one small/short bulkhead was damaged on my sample. When the Royal
Navy refitted the Atlantic Conveyor in April 1982 it was service as an auxiliary
carrier and of course elimination of deck fittings was a requirement. As a
result there are a cluster of fittings at the forecastle with assorted
windlasses, bollards and other anchor gear and then a smooth deck running from
the bow to the towering superstructure at the rear. Lining the deck edges
amidships are cargo containers. A few containers or deck edges are cast integral
to the hull but the vast majority of the cargo containers are separate parts.
The containers were piled up creating a wall at deck edge surrounding the
aircraft park on deck with the intention of providing protection for the
aircraft from Argentine attack and inclement weather. Deck fittings resume at
the very stern with a couple of winches at the RoRo cargo door.
The superstructure is composed of two major parts, a three story base and a
four story tapered tower with conical stack. The lower three deck piece did have
significant damage to the deck edge bulkheads but as mentioned at the start is
easily repairable. The part itself is well detailed with square windows at the
front face and portholes on all four faces. Additional detail comes in the form
of vertical ladder, recessed entrance vestibules and electrical/equipment
panels. The tower bridge is very nice except that it had the only true casting
defect that I found in the kit. My sample had a void front face bottom on the
port quarter that will need to be filled a smoothed. Although it will take
longer than simply replacing a broken bulkhead, the repair job is so small that
it is a mere speed bump. The sloping tower has square windows with wider
rectangular windows for the navigation deck at the top. The aft face presents an
interesting contrast with a step structure and smooth conical exhaust stack.
Three other major parts cast on a runner are the aft cargo door, forward
bulkhead, which separates the forecastle from cargo deck, and partial
quarterdeck. The forward bulkhead and cargo ramp are very nicely detailed. In
fact when the Super Etendard Exocet attack was detected, the Atlantic
Conveyor tried to turn to present her stern so that any missile
strike would hit the heavy ramp, rather than the thin skinned hull. The ship was
too slow in responding to the wheel and the ploy failed. Nonetheless when you
see the NNT cargo ramp you can
appreciate why Captain North tried to present the ramp to the missile.
There are numerous smaller resin parts. There are 25 separately cast cargo
containers. The containers ringing the aircraft park were left their original
colors, creating a riot of colors on the ship. Colors for the containers are
orange, green, red-brown, light gray, white and black. Four identical runners
provide ship’s boat, davits and I-shaped container support structures (part
3). Another sheet with eight runners has smaller support panels, RAF Harrier
ordnance and fittings. Most of these were broken from the runners in transit but
the parts themselves were not damaged. Another sheet provides some of the larger
parts such as the radar dome, platforms, small mast, larger boat and anchors.
One last runner has small parts, which appear to be life raft canisters. Sixteen
Harriers are included with two variations. The GR3 Harriers of the RAF Harriers
could be distinguished from the FS1 Sea Harriers in two details. The RAF birds
had a longer tapering nose and more ordnance store pylons than the FAA Harriers
with their conical nose and fewer pylons. NNT
provides both types. Some were broken from the runner in transit and will need
the tips of their noses reconnected. NNT
provides four of the big heavy lift Chinook Helicopters. Atlantic
Conveyor carried five when she sailed from
Great Britain
but landed one at
Ascension Island
, where she embarked the Harriers. The loss of three of these four Chinooks was
a severe blow for 3rd Commando. Six medium
Wessex
and one small Lynx helicopters are included. All aircraft have good detail from
paneling, windows, and photo-etch details.
Photo-Etch,
Decals & Instructions
Two photo-etch details are included. One fret are ship parts and the other fret
is for aircraft parts. Most of the ship photo-etch are runners of four bar
railing. Additional ship details consist of support braces, anchor chain,
vertical railing, two bar railing, accommodation ladders, boat gear and skids.
The aircraft detail fret has landing gear and rotors for the helicopters and the
wing stabilization struts for the Harriers. The large decal sheet has two green
and white aircraft launch/landing markings, one for stern and one for the bow.
You also receive bow and stern nameplate with the stern plates listing
Liverpool
under the name. There are a number of large black container doors (D9) and
smaller doors (D8). The balance of the set consists of aircraft roundels
although the side decals were off registry in that the center red dot was not
exactly centered. Instructions are workable but take study. They consist of two
large back-printed sheets. One sheet is just a list of parts and color
information. The second sheet has a plan, profile and sections on one side and
assembly instructions on the other sides. Resin
parts are numbered without a letter designation, PE parts have an E designator
and decals have a D designator. Identify each part before assembly and
compare with the plan and profile drawing. The instructions would have been
better in a larger more modular approach that presented a bigger view of each
step. Separate drawings for each of the aircraft types are also shown.
Verdict
The Cunard Atlantic Conveyor is the
largest NNT effort to date. This ship
was a key component of the Royal Navy strike force for the seizure of the
Falkland Islands
and her loss to an Argentine Exocet was one of the most severe blows suffered
by the British in the campaign. NNT
has produced a superb 1:700 scale Atlantic
Conveyor with resin and photo-etch parts, full detail sheet and
more aircraft on deck than either of the two British Aircraft Carriers.
 |
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
|